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Diverse Economies-Same Problems: The
Struggle for Corporate Governance Reform
in Russia and the United States
Colleen R. Stumpf'*
I. Introduction to the Need for Corporate Governance Reform
Since the fall of the Soviet Union and the subsequent transition to a
capitalist economy, new businesses have appeared rapidly in Russia.'
However, entrepreneurs, and even experienced business professionals,
struggle in the new Russian corporate climate due to a lack of corporate
2governance. Aleksei Panteliushin, for example, the owner of a sausage
factory, arrived at his facility one morning only to find it guarded by its
"new owners." 3 The "new owners" obtained control of the factory by
exploiting the weak enforcement of corporate governance laws in Russia
as well as through outright theft. Questions relating to corporate
* J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State
University, 2006; B.S. International Business, Grove City College, 2003. The author
dedicates this Comment to her husband, Ben, and her parents, Bruce and Deborah Piker,
in recognition of their love, support, patience, and prayers. The author would also like to
thank Dr. Andrew Markley, a valued friend and mentor. To the One who has done
immeasurably more than could be asked or imagined: every success remains in Your
honor.
1. Why Russian Companies Need to Improve Corporate Governance, International
Finance Corporation Russian Corporate Governance Project, at http://www2.ifc.org/
rcgp/adven.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2006).
2. Id. The International Finance Corporation and this Comment consider corporate
governance as "a system of interaction and mutual accountability of shareholders, board
of directors, managers and other stakeholders (employees, creditors, suppliers, local
authorities, public associations, etc.), aimed at maximizing the company's profits in
accordance with current legislation and international standards." Id.
3. Survey: Watch your back, ECONOMIST, May 22, 2004, at 13.
4. Id. Mr. Panteliushin began his fight to regain ownership of his sausage factory
in February 2004. Id. The "new owners'," or "goons'," scheme to appropriate the
factory began when they called a fictitious shareholder meeting and appointed a new
factory director. Id. The director sold the factory to another firm, which immediately
resold the factory. Id. Each subsequent owner re-registered his ownership of the
company after the sale, creating a paper trail, but one that is almost impossible to follow.
Survey: Watch your back, supra note 3. The "goons" then physically took over the
factory, destroyed the shareholder register Mr. Panteliushin kept in the factory safe and
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governance, such as monitoring, transparency, and the roles of officers
and the board of directors arose as news of similar corporate scandals in
Russia have come to light in recent years.5
Likewise, investigations of corporate scandals within highly valued
American companies, such as Enron, Tyco, and WorldCom, saturate the
international news. 6 Seemingly countless stories emerged of employees
who not only lost their jobs7 but all of their savings 8 because of the
fraudulent practices of numerous companies. 9 The large number of
scandals led to concerns regarding the state of corporate governance in
the United States.' 0  Investor confidence slipped," contributing to a
weaker stock market 12  and increasing demands for corporate
accountability.' 3 Questions of monitoring, transparency, and the roles of
bought any remaining shares from the employees at a discount. Id. The alternative to
selling? Being fired. Id.
While the goons' scheme may have been relatively simple, it was extremely
expensive; the cost of "necessary" bribes, hiring thugs, share buy-outs, and lawyers' fees
brought the price of the "takeover" to over $300,000 (USD). Id.
During the "takeover" process, the goons offered to sell the factory back to Mr.
Panteliushin for $6 million (USD), several times the factory's fair market value. Id.
Unfortunately, Mr. Panteliushin did not have the resources to buy back his factory, and
instead, he reported the incident to the local police, the internal security agency, tax
officials, and the Economic Security Commission. Survey: Watch your back, supra note
3. None of these governmental entities would offer any support without substantial
compensation; however, they did inform Mr. Panteliushin of similar takeovers that had
occurred in his region of Russia. Id. Governmental agencies finally did become involved
in the case after a local newspaper and The Economist ran the story in May 2004. Id.
While this intervention may help Mr. Panteliushin, only the enforcement of laws
addressing corporate governance can help his colleagues. Id.
At the time the article ran in The Economist, Mr. Panteliushin and the goons were in
a stalemate over a solution. Id. Companies that originally made offers to buy the factory
withdrew them after the authorities became involved. See Survey: Watch your back,
supra note 3. The goons were becoming more desperate to sell because, while they know
how to take over companies, they do not know how to make sausage. Id.
5. Yelena Shuvalova, Business: Corporate Governance Begins to Change in
Russia, Russ. J., Jun. 20, 2003, at 64-66.
6. Accounting Problems with WorldCom: Hearing of the H. Comm. on Fin.
Services, 107th Cong. (2002) [hereinafter Accounting Problems with WorldCom]




10. Conference Report on Corporate Responsibility Legislation, H.R. 3763, 10 7th
Cong. (2002) (statement of Rep. Michael Oxley, Chairman, H. Comm. on Fin. Serv.).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. Rep. Oxley stated that it is his belief that the market decline was not a result
of the inability of American companies to "compete and excel." Id. He blames high-
ranking corporate officials, who misled investors and, accountants, who ignored the
actions of the corporate officials. Conference Report on Corporate Responsibility
Legislation, supra note 10.
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officers and the board of directors,' 4 the same inquiries that are at the
forefront in Russia, suddenly arose in the United States-a country with
an advanced economy and a sophisticated corporate governance
system. 15
In the midst of their individual corporate governance problems, both
Russia and the United States recognized that investor confidence is
essential to the success of companies.16  In order to bolster fragile
investor confidence, the United States and Russia promulgated measures
to reform corporate governance.' 7 These measures, which came from
nations that are struggling with corporate governance, are strikingly
similar in some respects, but, in the same way that the countries have
divergent economic histories, the measures are completely divergent in
other respects.
Russia's Federal Commission for the Securities Market ("FCSM")
introduced the Code of Corporate Conduct ("Code") in 200218 as a
compilation of best practice recommendations to which the FCSM
encourages companies to adhere. The Code addresses topics such as
monitoring, transparency, and the board of directors.' 9 Also in 2002, the
United States Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act ("SOX"), 20 a set
of mandatory provisions that President George W. Bush described as
"the most far-reaching reforms of American business practices since the
time of Franklin Delano Roosevelt.",2' SOX, like its Russian counterpart,
also addresses aspects of monitoring, transparency, and the board of
directors.22
In the years since the adoption of these provisions, proponents of
increased corporate governance have welcomed the new provisions,23
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.; Corporate Governance in Russia: Regime Change Required, TRANSITION:
NEWSL. ABOUT REFORMING ECONOMIES (The World Bank, Washington, D.C.), Jan. 2003,
at 21. Investor confidence occurs when companies disclose their actions to shareholders
and stakeholders, enabling shareholders and stakeholders to use that information to
participate, freely and intelligently, in the ownership of the company. Corporate
Governance in Russia: Regime Change Required, supra note 16, at 21.
17. Conference Report on Corporate Responsibility Legislation, supra note 10;
Corporate Governance in Russia: Regime Change Required, supra note 16, at 21.
18. Corporate Governance Members Briefing, 11 Russ. Bus. WATCH 1, 11 (2003).
The FCSM is the principal governmental creator of corporate governance legislation in
Russia. Id.
19. Id. at 11-12.
20. Remarks on Signing Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 38 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOc.
1284, (July 30, 2002).
21. Id.
22. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204 (2002).
23. See Judith Bums, Is Sarbanes-Oxley Working? We asked a variety of experts;
Most of them said yes-with some caveats, WALL ST. J., Jun. 21, 2004, at R.1; see also
2006]
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highlighting the fact that they help to increase investor confidence and
limit the number of corporate financial scandals.24  Critics, however,
have challenged such claims. 25 They question whether the provisions
adequately address the demand for corporate accountability 26 and wonder
if companies actually adhere to the internal and external supervision
standards outlined by the regulations.27
This Comment begins with a comparison of the provisions of the
Russian Code of Corporate Conduct to the U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, in
light of their provisions addressing internal and external monitoring.
More importantly, however, this Comment then analyzes these
provisions in order to determine if they are indeed addressing the
demand for corporate disclosure, transparency, and accountability in
their respective countries. Section II explores the historical background
of both the Code and SOX, with significant focus on the corporate
development of each country. Section II also outlines how each country
developed a hierarchy of review in order to provide for internal and
external audits of business decisions. Section III focuses on the
comparison of these supervision standards. This section endeavors to
show how the standards (1) deal with the corporate governance
deficiencies in each country and (2) attempt to achieve corporate
accountability and transparency by using internal and external audits.
Section IV discusses the domestic and international reactions to
these promulgated provisions, as well their perceived effectiveness.
Section V suggests improvements to the Code and SOX, focusing on the
necessity for enforcement of the Code and the need for a cost analysis of
SOX.
Section VI concludes that although both countries have taken
significant steps toward the development of corporate governance, more
work needs to be done. This Comment resolves that, at the very least,
each country must educate those involved in business as well as the
public regarding the benefits of sound corporate governance. At most,
the entire mindset of the business world needs to change and accept that
corporate governance is essential to successful organizational
development and is not merely good business practice.
II. Background of the Provisions
The rationale driving the creation of the Russian Code and the
Shuvalova, supra note 5, at 61-64.
24. See Bums, supra note 23, at R.I.
25. See id.
26. Id.
27. See id. Critics question if the cost of adhering to the new regulations is actually
worth the trouble. Id.
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United States' SOX was primarily the same: the regular occurrence of
corporate scandals caused by a lack of adherence to corporate
governance standards.28 However, the reason for the lack of corporate
governance differed significantly in each county.
A. The Development of Russia's Code of Corporate Conduct
Although the Soviet Union collapsed nearly fifteen years ago,29
Russia is still in the process of developing a viable market-based
economy.3°  Corporate governance, with its focus on corporate
accountability, is one piece necessary for the creation of a successful
capitalist economy.3' This fact should not diminish the importance of
effective corporate governance because its absence contributes to many
of the current market problems.32 The FCSM recognized the significance
of sound corporate governance and the need to improve Russia's
floundering corporate governance. In response to these needs, the FCSM
developed the Code of Corporate Conduct.33
1. Country Conditions Creating a Need for Corporate
Governance Reform in Russia
Modern corporate governance has existed in Russia only since the
fall of the Soviet Union.34 This historical failing is one of the country's
28. The Corporate and Auditing Accountability, Responsibility, and Transparency
Act of 2002 (Day 3): Hearing on H.R. 3763 Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Serv., 107th
Cong. (Apr. 9, 2002) [hereinafter The Corporate and Auditing Accountability,
Responsibility, and Transparency Act of 2002] (statement of Rep. Mike Ferguson,
Chairman.); see also Svetlana Letova, Business: Cleaning Up, Russ. J., Mar. 31, 2003, at
84.
29. Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, A History of Russia 611 (6th ed. 2000).
30. HUGH RAGSDALE, THE RUSSIAN TRAGEDY: THE BURDEN OF HISTORY 269-72
(1996); see RIASANOVSKY, supra note 29, at 601-07. It is an especially difficult transition
to a market-economy in Russia because the country has never had a free economy. See
RAGSDALE, supra note 30, at 269-72. Prior to seventy years of Communist rule, the
monarchy controlled Russia with the czars keeping strict controls on markets
transactions, especially those transactions with foreign nations. Id. Even after the
collapse of the Communist regime, very few people, even educated business
professionals could conceive of working in a corrupt, non-governmental controlled
market. Id.
31. Corporate Governance Members Briefing, supra note 18, at 11.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Shuvalova, supra note 5, at 64. In comparison, other industrial nations,
specifically Western nations, can date their history of corporate governance back
hundreds of years. Id. Many other countries that are transitioning from Communist
economies to market-based economies also are struggling with a lack of corporate
governance. Id.
Alternatively, Yulia Kochetygova, director of the corporate governance ratings
2006)
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main obstacles in its transition to a market-based economy.35 Corporate
governance shortfalls, characterized by infringements on shareholder
rights and poor company management, fed the lack of confidence foreign
and domestic investors had in Russian companies.36  Specifically,
Russian companies faced the following issues:
37
* deficiencies in corporate management relative to
transparency;
38
* deficiencies in corporate accountability between the
management and shareholders;
39
* discriminatory treatment of minority shareholders;
40
" deficiencies in the coordination of shareholders and
stakeholders, hindering their ability to successfully
advocate;
41
* poor promulgation of corporate governance as a matter of
corporate culture; 42 and
* inefficient enforcement of existing corporate governance
legislation.43
President Vladimir Putin recognized these shortcomings, which
exist in other industrialized countries, and committed himself and his
country to corporate governance reform when he said that
Russia has a strategic goal-to become a country that makes
department at Standard and Poor's in Moscow, claims that while Russia may lag behind
the Western nations in most aspects of corporate governance, the West can learn some
valuable corporate governance lessons from Russia. Vladimir Kozlov, Corporate
Governance: Investor Pressure Forcing Improvement, Russ. J., Feb. 22, 2002, at 1. For
example, in Russia, one person cannot act as both the chief executive officer of a
company and the chairman of that company's board of directors, a practice common in
the United States, but which has lead to situations where that individual wields too much
power without appropriate checks and balances. Id. Additionally, only the shareholders
of Russian companies have the ability to nominate candidates for the board of directors, a
practice to which American companies do not adhere, sometimes resulting in directors
who insiders have nominated working for the good of those insiders, rather than working
to maximize shareholder value. Id.













competitive goods and renders competitive services. All our efforts
are committed to this goal. We understand that we have to solve
questions pertaining to the protection of owners' rights and the
improvement of corporate governance and financial transparency in
business in order to be integrated into world capital markets.
44
It is essential that Russian companies improve their corporate
governance so that they can attract investment, improve efficiency, and
lower the cost of capital.45 In an effort to achieve these goals, the FCSM
published the Code in April 200246 as a compilation of best practice
recommendations that companies are encouraged to adopt.47  The
standards of corporate behavior found in the Code provide guidance on
how to structure relationships found in joint stock companies a4 such as
the interaction between shareholders, members of the board of directors,
and members of the executive bodies.49
Russian companies are not required to adopt the Code provisions.
5 °
Rather, the government only encourages their use.51 The Code does urge
companies to develop their own corporate governance codes to reflect
44. Russian President Vladimir Putin, Remarks (Oct. 2001), reprinted in White
Paper on Corporate Governance 3 (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development 2002).
45. Why Russian Companies Need to Improve Corporate Governance, supra note 1.
Major investors display a preference for investing in companies, whether domestic or
international, which adhere to high standards of corporate governance because these
companies have improved their efficiency by streamlining all of their business processes,
resulting in a higher rate of return for investors. Id. These investors are willing to pay a
premium for shares of Russian companies that comply with the same high corporate
governance standards as other successful, international companies. Id.
46. Governmental agencies, such as the United States Department of Commerce and
the United States Agency for International Development, non-governmental agencies,
such as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development and the
International Finance Corporation, and international organizations, such as The World
Bank, all contributed monetary and intellectual resources to assist in the creation of the
Code of Corporate Governance. U.S.-Russia Business Council, CODE OF CORPORATE
CONDUCT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (FED. COMM'N FOR THE SEC. MKT. 2002), at
http://www.usrbc.org (last visited Dec. 18, 2004).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. Russian "executive bodies" are analogous to "corporate officers" found in
American corporations. Id. Joint stock companies focus on soliciting capital investment
from both domestic and foreign sources, and, consequently, have the greatest potential
for corporate governance-related conflicts because there is a substantial separation
between the company's shareholders and the company's officers. CODE OF CORPORATE
CONDUCT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 46.
50. U.S.-Russia Business Council, CODE OF CORPORATE CONDUCT INTRODUCTION
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ethical, rather than legislative, corporate governance requirements.52
2. Supervision Sections of the Code of Corporate Conduct
The Code contains ten chapters that deal with topics ranging from
the holding of a general shareholder meeting to the distribution of
corporate dividends.53 Many of the provisions are similar to those found
in a state corporate code in the United States.
Of particular interest to this Comment are those Code provisions
that introduce the four supervisory bodies 54 responsible for the review of
a company's daily financial and business operations.55 The goal of
supervision is to protect shareholders' capital investments and the assets
of the company.56 The four monitoring bodies interact to provide the
requisite oversight to increase transparency.57 The first body is the
control and audit service, comprised of company employees;59 the
second is the audit commission,6° made up of the members of the
52. Id. Ethical standards typically are more stringent than statutorily created
standards, because legislators often dilute statutory standards so that the legislation can
be passed. Id. Ethics, however, present "a set system of behavioral norms and customs
of the trade traditionally applied by the business community, which are not based on the
law, and which form positive expectations with respect to the anticipated behavior of
participants in corporate relations." Id.
53. U.S.-Russia Business Council, CODE OF CORPORATE CONDUCT (FED. COMM'N
FOR THE SEC. MKT. 2002), at http://www.usrbc.org (last visited Dec. 18, 2004)
[hereinafter CODE OF CORPORATE CONDUCT]. The ten chapters are entitled, Principles of
Corporate Governance, General Shareholder Meeting, Board of Directors of the
Company, Executive Bodies of the Company, Corporate Secretary of the Company,
Major Corporate Actions, Disclosure of Information About a Company, Supervision of
Financial and Business Operations of the Company, Dividends, and Resolution of
Corporate Conflicts. Id.
54. CODE OF CORPORATE CONDUCT, supra note 53, at ch. 8.
55. See id.
56. Id. The protection of shareholders' capital investments and company assets will
result when the following items have occurred:
(1) approval and making arrangements for implementation of the financial and
business plan;
(2) establishment of and ensuring compliance with efficient internal control
producers;
(3) implementation in the company of an efficient and transparent management
system, including preventing and curing errors and abuses on the part of
executive bodies and officers of the company;
(4) prevention, detection and minimization of financial and operation risk; and
(5) ensuring accuracy of the financial information used or disclosed by the
company.
Id.
57. Id. at ch. 8.





company's executive bodies;61 the third is the audit committee of the
board of directors; 62 and the fourth is the independent auditors, retained
to review the company's financial statements.63
a. The Role of the Control and Audit Service
The audit and control service, whose members are company
employees, 64 performs the first level of supervision 65 by reviewing the
company's daily operations to ensure adherence to the goals of the
organization's business and financial plans.66 In the hope of obtaining
better technical analysis of business operations, the Code recommends
that the head of the control and audit service and the majority of the other
employees have an advanced financial or economic education, or in the
67alternative, a legal education. Consequently, the members of the
control and audit service are often better educated than their colleagues.68
To avoid influence by company executives, which could have a
detrimental effect on the employees' ability to control and review
business functions,69 the members of the control and audit service are
independent of these officers.7° One way this independence is achieved
is through the unique negotiation of the labor contracts for the members
of the control and audit service. 71 The board of directors' chairman
personally handles contract negotiations with the head of the control and
audit service, 72 while other service members deal with other company
directors.73
A second function of the control and audit service, which exists in
conjunction with the audit committee, is to create, implement, and
administer an efficient internal system of controls that monitor all
business and financial operations.74  Internal controls allow an
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. CODE OF CORPORATE CONDUCT, supra note 53, at ch. 8, § 1.3.3. All members of
these groups should have impeccable reputations in their personal and professional
business dealings, in order to ensure that they will perform their duties with the best
interests of the company in mind. Id.
64. Id. at ch. 8, § 1.3.5.
65. Id. at ch. 8, § 2.1.1.
66. Id. at ch. 8, § 1.3.5.
67. CODE OF CORPORATE CONDUCT, supra note 53, at ch. 8, § 1.3.2.
68. Id.
69. Id. at ch. 8, § 1.3.5.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. CODE OF CORPORATE CONDUCT, supra note 53, at ch. 8, § 1.3.5.
73. Id. This also is true for those employees that serve on the human resources and
remuneration committee or the audit committee. Id.
74. Id. at ch. 8, § 1.2. The Code defines "internal controls" as control of a
2006]
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organization to quickly recognize and avoid financial and operating risks,
while also preventing potential financial abuses by the company's
officers.75 The most effective internal controls reduce a company's
expenses and facilitate efficient management of the company's
resources.
76
After the completion of a financial or business operation, the control
and audit service reviews the documents associated with that transaction.
This ensures that the matter conforms to the corporation's business plan
77
and verifies that the documents adhere to the established internal control
78procedures. In particular, the control and audit service determines
whether departments obtained the necessary consent from senior
members of those departments before executing the business operation.79
Additionally, any funds invested in the operation must be a permissible
expenditure under the business plan.80 Finally, if there are any violations
of the internal controls found, the control and audit service reports these
infractions to the board of director's audit committee.8 '
There are instances when it is necessary for a company to perform
business operations that fall outside of the scope of the business plan. 2
In this situation, the control and audit service preliminarily approves the
proposed non-traditional operation.83 Before final consent, the control
and audit service determines why the operation was not a part of the
original business plan,84 why the operation is necessary, 8' and if it is
possible to delay the operation until the transaction can be restructured to
fit within the business plan. 6 The control and audit service presents its
findings to the board of directors' audit committee who makes the final
decision regarding the actual performance of the proposed operation.87
company's financial and business operations, including the execution of the financial and
business plan by the company's business divisions. Id. The board of directors approves
the proposed system of internal controls. CODE OF CORPORATE CONDUCT, supra note 53,
at ch. 8, § 1.2.
75. Id. atch. 8,§ 1.1.1.
76. Id.
77. Id. at ch. 8, § 2.1.1. The company's business plan, which all business operations
should follow, is a document that defines the business and financial activity of the
company. Id.




82. Id. at ch. 8, § 2.2.2.




87. Id. The company's internal documents should vest in the board of directors the
ability to veto justifiably any proposed non-traditional operation. CODE OF CORPORATE
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By fulfilling these various monitoring functions, the control and
audit service is the first line of defense against corporate abuse.
However, the potentially more valuable result of the control and audit
service is that it directly facilitates the Code's goals of supervision,
transparency, and corporate accountability by reviewing the company's
daily operations to ensure compliance with the business and financial
plans.
b. The Role of the Audit Commission
Members of the company's executive bodies88 make up the audit
commission, the second level of supervision.89  This body has the
primary duty of performing the company's annual internal audit,90 as
well as periodic assessments of extraordinary operations. 91 The members
of the audit committee prepare an opinion based upon the conclusions of
the audit 92 that all audit committee members are required to sign.93 If a
member disagrees with the commission's report, that member may write
a separate dissenting opinion and attach it to the committee report.
94
c. The Role of the Audit Committee of the Board of Directors
The audit committee, a committee of independent directors, directly
controls the business and financial operations of the company.95 The
audit committee's primary function is to evaluate the performance of,
CONDUCT, supra note 53, at ch. 8, § 2.2.2. If it appears that there are many reasonable
non-traditional operations that the company needs to perform, the board of directors may




90. Id. at ch.8, § 3.1. The audit committee has ninety days from the date of
commencement to complete the annual audits. CODE OF CORPORATE CONDUCT, supra
note 53, at ch. 8, § 3.1.
91. Id. at ch. 8, § 3.1.1. The audit commission conducts extraordinary audits for a
specific business operation or all operations over a specified period, as requested by the
board of directors or the shareholders. Id. Unlike annual audits, the audit commission
must complete these audits within thirty days of such a request. Id. Within three days of
the completion of the extraordinary audit, the audit commission presents their opinion to
the party who requested the audit. Id.
92. CODE OF CORPORATE CONDUCT, supra note 53, at ch. 8, § 3.1.
93. Id.
94. Id. at ch. 8, § 3.1.4. Decisions made by the audit committee require a majority
vote and the Code does not permit audit committee members to transfer their voting
rights to third party. Id. While the Code does not require a quorum to be present prior to
bringing an issue to a vote, it does require that a majority of the audit committee be
present to hold a meeting. Id. at ch. 8, § 3.1.2.
95. CODE OF CORPORATE CONDUCT, supra note 53, at ch. 8, § 1.3.1.
2006]
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and adherence to, the company's financial and business plans.96 In order
for the audit committee to carry out these critical assignments
successfully, its members need unlimited access to all of the company's
documents.
97
At each meeting, the audit committee discusses any deviations from
the business and finance plans found in the company's documents9" and
prepares conclusions based upon its analysis. 99 These conclusions may
include: (1) the reasons for violations of the business and financial
plans; (2) who might be liable; and (3) recommendations as to how to
avoid future infractions. 100 The audit committee presents its conclusions
to the entire board of directors. 01
d. The Role of the Independent Auditors
The fourth body of supervision outlined by the Code is the
independent auditor. An independent auditor certifies that all of the
company's financial reports were prepared pursuant to either Russian or
international accounting standards. 10 2 It also reviews the annual reports
to ascertain if there are any errors or violations of the law.'0 3 The
company must amend any infraction the auditor finds before
shareholders receive the reports. 10 4 The auditors should also take part in
the annual shareholder meeting so that they may address any issues
shareholders raise regarding the annual reports. 1
05
B. United States' Sarbanes-Oxley Act
The world recognizes the United States as a nation with an
advanced free-market economy, successful companies, and successful
stock markets. 106 However, events in recent years cast doubt on this rosy
96. Id. If it is impossible for the entire audit committee to be composed of
independent directors, then at a minimum, an independent director serves as the head of
the committee, and the members should not be company executives. Id.
97. Id. at ch. 8, § 2.3.1. The control and audit service, executive bodies, employees,
and the independent auditor may provide the documentation to the audit committee. Id.
98. CODE OF CORPORATE CONDUCT, supra note 53, at ch. 8, § 2.3.1.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at ch. 8, § 2.3.2.
102. Id. at ch. 8, § 4.1.6.
103. CODE OF CORPORATE CONDUCT, supra note 53, at ch. 8, § 4.1.3. The auditors
may not repair violations; they may only locate them. Id. The audit committee
supervises the work of the independent auditors. Id.
104. Id. at ch. 8, § 4.1.4.
105. Id. at ch. 8, § 4.1.3.
106. See Accounting Problems with WorldCom, supra note 6.
[Vol. 24:4
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view of America's financial system.' °7 The downfall of powerful
companies such as Enron, WorldCom, and others, 0 8 led to concerns
about the accountability of American corporations to their
shareholders.109
1. Country Conditions Creating a Need for Corporate
Governance Reform in the United States
Corporate governance in the United States, although it has existed
for years, was never a hot issue until several years ago. °10 The trend of
reforming corporate governance began in 20021 when Enron,'1 2 one of
the world's largest energy companies,' 13 suddenly filed for Chapter 11
bankruptcy,' 14 causing a loss in share value and the loss of employees'
pensions.15
The name "Enron," once symbolizing a strong and powerful
company,1 6 is now synonymous with corporate scandal." 17 In the fallout
that occurred in the months following the bankruptcy filing, investors,
analysts, and the international community discovered that Enron was not
the corporate giant most of the world believed. 1 8  The company hid
massive amounts of debt by transferring it to off-balance sheet
partnerships that technically are permissible, 119 but which can lead to
questions regarding a lack of transparency.1 20 Additionally, the use of
the partnerships to shield debt made Enron's debt ratios appear more
favorable to investors, 121 although the company was unable to cover their
obligations. 122  The federal government launched an investigation of




110. See generally id.
111. See generally Accounting Problems with WorldCom, supra note 6.
112. For a thorough discussion of Enron and the company's accounting scandal from
the prospective of the Enron employee and whistleblower, Sherron Watkins, see MIMI
SWARTZ & SHERRON WATKINS, POWER FAILURE: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE COLLAPSE OF
ENRON (2004).
113. See Kurt Eichenwald, Enron's Collapse; Audacious Climb to Success Ended in a
Dizzying Plunge, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2001, at A1.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See generally SWARTZ & WATKINS, supra note 112.
117. Id.
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corporate headquarters. 1
23
Arthur Andersen & Company, Enron's independent auditor, became
embroiled in the scandal when it admitted to errors in its audit of
Enron. 124 Arthur Andersen's involvements led to questions about the
role of independent auditors when reviewing their clients' business
dealings. 125 Allegations arose that Arthur Andersen was more concerned
about Enron paying the accounting firm for its services, 126 rather than
being concerned about actually performing these accounting and auditing
services. 127
In the wake of the Enron and Arthur Andersen scandals, President
George W. Bush, voicing concern over the lack of transparency and
integrity in American companies, 128 outlined a ten-step plan to restore
confidence in the American corporate system.129 The plan required chief
executives to personally vouch for the validity of their company's
financial statements,' 30 suggested that corporations should ban officers
who abused their power from participation in corporate leadership, 131 and
proposed the creation of a private board to oversee the accounting
industry. 132 Additionally, President Bush recommended banning some
accounting practices,' such as a single accounting firm serving both as
a company's internal and external auditor. 134  This ten-step plan
eventually crystallized itself into the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 135 which
President Bush signed into law on July 2002.136
2. "Supervision" Provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley Act
SOX presents a set of requirements for the oversight of an
123. David Streitfeld & James Gerstenzang, Federal Agents Probe Shredding Inside
Enron, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2002, at Al.
124. Andrew Hill, Sheila McNulty, & Gwen Robinson, The Enron Failure-Counting
the Cost, FN. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2001, at 18.
125. David Nicholas, Checks Failed, Leaving Investors Vulnerable, ST. Louis POST-
Dis., Feb. 10, 2002, at B1.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Andrew Hill & Peter Spiegel, Feeling the heat: George W. Bush wants chief
executives to become more accountable for financial problems at their companies





133. Bob Kemper, Bush Tells CEOs to Strengthen Ethics; President Offers 10 steps to
Better Accountability, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 8, 2002, at 8.
134. Id.




American corporation's financial dealings.' 37  The act is primarily
concerned with three types of supervisors:' 38  (1) the senior financial
executives; 139 (2) the board of director's audit committee;1 40 and (3) the
independent auditors. 14  Unlike the Russian Code, SOX does not outline
the functions of each supervisory body. Instead, SOX amended existing
statutes that provide the groundwork for the monitoring bodies and
leveled penalties against those companies that do not adhere to the new




Under SOX, senior executives, who sign the reports that the
company submits to the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"),
are responsible for more than merely reviewing them. 143  Signing
executives affirm that the reports do not contain any "untrue statement of
material fact,"'144 that the information included in the reports fairly
137. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002)
(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
138. See id.
139. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 §§ 301-308.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission issued a final rule defining
"internal control over financial reporting" as:
[A] process designed by, or under the supervision of, the registrant's principal
executive and principal officers, or persons performing similar finctions, and
effected by the registrant's board of directors, management and other
personnel, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial
reporting and the preparation of financial statements for external purposes in
accordance with generally accepted accounting principals and includes those
policies and procedures that:
(1) Pertain to the maintenance of records that in reasonable detail
accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets
of the registrant;
(2) Provide reasonable assurance that transactions are recorded as
necessary to permit preparation of financial statements in accordance with
generally accepted accounting principles, and that receipts and
expenditures of the registrant are being made only in accordance with
authorizations of management and directors of the registrant; and
(3) Provide reasonable assurance regarding prevention or timely detection
of the registrant's assets that could have a material effect on the financial
statements.
Management's Reports on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting and Certification of
Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports, 68 Fed. Reg. 36636, 36640 (June 18, 2003)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240.13a-15(f)).
143. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 302, 116 Stat. 745, 777
(2002) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
144. Id.
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represents the actual financial condition of the company, 145 and that any
potential fraud is disclosed to the audit committee and the auditors.
146
The signing officers also are responsible for creating internal controls
that enable material information regarding the company and its
subsidiaries to pass efficiently to other officers, 147 as well as ensuring
that the auditors are put on notice of changes to the control
mechanisms.1
48
b. The Audit Committee
SOX requires that members of the board of director's audit
committee are independent directors. 49 This committee of independent
directors is responsible for the selection and compensation of any public
accounting firm retained by the company, 50 and the supervision of the
audit work performed by that firm. 15  The other main responsibility of
the audit committee is to establish a system to manage and address
complaints made by employees regarding questionable accounting
practices or audit matters. 1
52
c. The Independent External Auditors
The drafters of SOX viewed the independence of external auditors
as paramount. 153 Consequently, under the new law, auditors must not
have any other interaction with the company, or its executives,
contemporaneously with the audit. 54 To prevent the corporate officers
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. Other members of the management also assist in the creation and
implementation of the internal control system. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 404.
Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act charges the Securities and Exchange Commission
with the promulgation of rules requiring the annual report to contain an internal control
report. Id. This report must (1) state the responsibility of management to establish and
maintain the internal control system and the procedures used for financial reporting and
(2) an assessment of the effectiveness of the internal control system and the financial
reporting procedures. Id. The independent auditors must attest to the assessment made
by the management. Id.
148. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 302, 116 Stat. 745, 777
(2002) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
149. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301. In order to be considered independent, an
officer must not accept any compensatory fee from the company or be affiliated with any
of the company's subsidiaries. Id. If the Securities and Exchange Commission approves
the exemption, a director may be exempt from these independence requirements. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301.
153. Conference Report on Corporate Responsibility Legislation, supra note 10.
154. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 201. Non-audit services include:
(1) bookkeeping or other services related to the accounting records or financial
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and directors from influencing the auditors,'55 SOX requires the rotation
of the accounting firm's lead audit partner every five years.1
5 6
The independent auditor must inform the audit committee as to
which accounting practices it used to conduct the audit,1 57 alternative
treatments of financial information that the auditor discussed with the
company's management, 158 and any material written communication that
has occurred between the auditor and the management.159
III. Comparing the Supervision Standards Found in Russia's Code of
Corporate Conduct and the United States' Sarbanes-Oxley Act
Both the Code and SOX are responses to proven and perceived
failures in the corporate governance systems of their respective
countries. 60 Their approval by the Russian and United States
governments were indicators that each nation's leaders understood the
inherent weaknesses in previous corporate governance structures and
their desire to address these problems. 16' At their core, each country's
corporate governance deficiencies were alike, and both governments
chose to address these deficiencies in a similar and standard fashion.
Yet, there are some differences created by the circumstances found in
each country.
Russia's Code provides the groundwork necessary for corporate
governance, while the United States' SOX establishes more of the
nuances needed to provide efficient supervision of a company's
statements of the audit client;
(2) financial information systems design and implementation;
(3) appraisal or valuation services, fairness opinions, or contribution-in-kind
reports;
(4) actuarial services;
(5) internal audit outsourcing services;
(6) management functions or human resources;
(7) broker or dealer, investment adviser, or investment banking services;
(8) legal services and expert services unrelated to the audit;
(9) any other service that the Board determines, by regulation is impermissible.
Id. The auditor may perform some of these services, including tax services, if the audit
committee approves of the activity. Id.
155. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 303.
156. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 203. The lead audit partner has primary responsibility for
the audit. Id.
157. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 204, 116 Stat. 745, 773
(2002) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Conference Report on Corporate Responsibility Legislation, supra note 10;
Corporate Governance in Russia: Regime Change Required, supra note 16, at 21.
161. See The Corporate and Auditing Accountability, Responsibility, and
Transparency Act of 2002, supra note 28; see also Letova, supra note 28, at 84.
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operations. SOX also outlines the potentially harsh penalties for failing
to adhere to the mandatory regulations, 162 while the Code merely is a
compilation of suggested best practice standards promulgated by the
Russian government and does not include any penalties for failing to
adhere to the recommendations.
1 63
Upon examination, one discovers that both sets of provisions,
despite their differences, are attempting to achieve the same goals of
corporate accountability and transparency through internal and external
monitoring bodies.1 64 The signing requirements to which members of
Russian audit commissions, who are also company executives, must
adhere 165 are similar to the signature requirements to which SOX holds
American executives. 166  Both sets of provisions adopted similar
independence requirements for the members of the board of directors
who sit on the audit committee and for the independent auditors.
67
The glaring difference between the monitoring provisions of the
corporate governance documents occurs in the creation of a control and
audit service in Russia. 168 Russia adds an initial level of monitoring with
the creation of the control and audit service, 169 a group exclusively made
up of company employees.1 70 Although American employees do assist in
the creation and implementation of their internal monitoring systems,
American managers ultimately are responsible for performing
monitoring duties.
17 1
This initial level of internal monitoring may be successful in Russia
because it has never had any form of "corporate governance."
1 72
Companies in Russia may need this additional level as a safeguard
against corporate fraud. When one considers that Russian companies
must build their corporate governance systems from the ground up, the
inclusion of a control and audit service is no more drastic than other
reforms that companies implement. Additionally, it may be no more
expensive in Russia to create a control and audit service while creating
other levels of monitoring.
162. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002)
(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
163. CODE OF CORPORATE CONDUCT, supra note 53.
164. Id. at ch. 8, § 3.1; Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 §§ 301-308.
165. CODE OF CORPORATE CONDUCT, supra note 53, at ch. 8, § 3.1.
166. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 302.
167. CODE OF CORPORATE CONDUCT, supra note 53, at ch. 8, § 1.3.1; Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 § 301.
168. CODE OF CORPORATE CONDUCT, supra note 53, at ch. 8, § 1.3.
169. Id. at § 1.3.5.
170. Id. at ch. 8, § 1.2.
171. Practising Law Institute, Fraud and the Role of the Audit Committee, 1449
PLI/Corp. 1177, 1182 (Oct. 2004).
172. Shuvalova, supra note 5, at 64.
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There are two reasons why the creation of another formal level of
monitoring may not be beneficial to the corporate governance system
already in place in United States companies. First, the United States,
unlike Russia, has a base upon which to build corporate governance
reform. Most American companies now have some sort of internal
monitoring system, whether in the form of whistleblower protections or
committees that review corporate transactions. 73  Consequently,
requiring American companies to create a control and audit committee
may duplicate an existing internal monitoring system. Alternatively, a
new system potentially could replace an effective internal monitoring
system that has been adapted to the specific needs of the company with a
mechanism that may not be appropriate for the particular company in
question.
Furthermore, because there are complaints that the implementations
of the additional standards found in SOX are too expensive, 174 the
creation of a control and audit service could be even more burdensome
for some companies. American corporations need the flexibility to form
an internal monitoring system that best suits the goals and objectives of
each company, but which is still within the budget of the organization.
Consequently, a control and audit system, although helpful in
establishing Russian corporate governance, may not be as essential to
corporate governance reform in the United States.
Although there are differences between the American and the
Russian corporate governance systems, the basic goals of each are the
same-to increase the transparency and corporate accountability of
companies. Now that Russia and the United States have instituted their
respective provisions, two new questions and potential differences arise.
The first asks how companies in each country are accepting the new
regulations, while the second addresses the actual success of the
regulations in achieving better corporate governance.
IV. Reactions to New Corporate Governance Regulations in Russia and
the United States
Companies, consumers, and critics constantly are consumed with
analyzing the possible impact of new governmental regulations on a
nation's businesses and economy, usually even before the regulations
take effect. These initial perceptions may linger forever, but the best
indicator of a new provision's effectiveness cannot be rendered until that
provision has been in place for some significant amount of time. Both
the Russian Code and the American SOX have been in place for several
173. Practising Law Institute, supra note 171, at 1182.
174. Bums, supra note 23, at R.8.
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years, making this an ideal time to review the provisions.
A. Considering the Russian Code of Corporate Conduct
In Russia, studies show that large companies view the voluntary
implementation of the Code as a positive initiative for their companies
and the country's economy.175  Even a significant number of the
businesses that have not introduced the Code recognize that improved
corporate governance, especially more sophisticated internal controls,
make them more attractive to domestic and foreign investors.
176
Consequently, some of these organizations make the Code's
implementation one of their goals for the future.
177
Those companies that have implemented the Code and have
developed internal controls, even in part, show some improvement in
investor confidence.178 This is especially true of those companies that
now have independent directors seated on their board of directors.
1 79
175. Christopher Kenneth, Corporate Governance Ethics Finally Taking Root in
Russia, Russ. J., Mar. 31, 2003, at 81. The International Financial Corporation, the
investment section of the World Bank, with the help of the Netherlands and Switzerland
governments, polled 304 CEOs regarding the Russia Code of Corporate Conduct. Id. Of
the CEOs polled, about forty-nine percent believed that implementing the Code was
important to their companies. Id.
Conversely, the overwhelming majority of small and mid-sized companies do not
view problems associated with corporate governance to be as essential to the success of
their companies as do large corporations, possibly because these smaller companies are
not trying to attract the same large-scale and foreign investors to which larger companies
are appealing. IV. Belikov, Adoption of the Russian Code of Corporate Conduct:
Accomplishments and Problems, 25 (Oct. 23, 2003), at http://www.riu.ru/uploads/
db2fileen/RussianCGCodeOECDrep21OO3eng.pdf. Therefore, smaller Russian
companies do not view the implementation of the Code of Corporate Conduct as a
company objective. Id.
176. Belikov, supra note 175, at 23.
177. Kenneth, supra note 175, at 81. One barrier to the Code's universal
implementation in Russia is the lack of understanding of the Code's value and
importance. Id. Russia simply does not have the specialized manpower to campaign for
the Code, particularly in the outer regions of the country. Id. at 82.
178. Alex Nicholson, Independent Directors Find Seat on the Board, Mos. TIMES,
Oct. 10, 2003, at 14. To some extent, frighteningly enough, investor confidence in
Russia may be tied merely to the high price of oil!
179. Id. Alexander Filatov of the National Association of Independent Directors, a
body established to promote the appointment of independent directors, said, "Today it's
not just minority shareholders that are interested in putting forward independent
representatives, but the companies themselves, their controlling and strategic
shareholders. The companies feel real returns from the inclusion of independent
members on the board, which make them more attractive to investors and raise their
capitalization." Id.
Filatov also stated that a survey conducted by Ernst & Young showed that the
presence of independent directors serving on the board of directors was the primary
factor affecting investment attractiveness. Id. Companies that have become even more
successful after the inclusion of independent directors include YUKOS, LUKoil, Wimm-
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Unfortunately, drastic improvement seems to be limited to those top
Russian companies that are attempting to make themselves more
attractive to foreign investors, 180 and, therefore, are working harder to
improve their corporate governance structure.' 81
Many Russian managers still fear the inclusion of independent
directors because these directors should demand answers to those
questions that directors in the current business structure do not want to
ask and current management does not want to answer. 182 Such unease
may occur because inquisitive directors could restrict the freedom of
powerful managers.1 83 In the alternative, fear of probing directors may
stem from the managers' belief that new independent directors, who
supposedly adhere to the Code, will perform their oversight duties better
than the current independent directors discharge theirs.
18 4
There is, however, a contradiction when examining the
implementation of the recommendations for improving internal
monitoring in Russian companies.' 85 Although there is a widespread
desire to improve internal control systems, companies, at the same time,
are hesitant to form a control and audit service and an audit committee of
the board of directors. 186  This occurs because companies simply are
reluctant to disclose information relating to their financial transactions,
187
a possible result of managers' fears that the internal auditors will
question the transactions and reduce their power.' 88 Additionally, even
those companies that have created these internal control bodies
subsequently are reluctant to provide the bodies with the information
needed to perform adequately their monitoring duties.
89
Beyond problems relating to corporate governance, Russian
companies also face issues that American businesses would not even
consider. It is common in Russia for government officials to demand
bribes in order to have filings approved or applications accepted.
Additionally, there are many conflicting and overlapping laws in the
Bill-Dann, Norilsk Nickel, Sibnef, United Heavy Machineries, and Vimpelcom. Id.
180. Belikov, supra note 175, at 23.
181. Nicholson, supra note 178, at 14.
182. Id.
183. Belikov, supra note 175, at 6.
184. Id. at 7.
185. Id.
186. Id. While there is a lack of control and audit committees, many companies do
have an audit commission as required by the Code of Corporate Conduct and the Federal
Law "On Joint Stock Companies." Id. at 10. However, a substantial number of those
companies that do have an audit commission do not conduct internal audits, making the
audit commission superfluous. Belikov, supra note 175, at 10.
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country, so that in following one law, another may be broken. The result
of these additional concerns is that corporate transparency is nearly
impossible because it would reveal "illegal" conduct by the company. In
order for the Code to be truly successful in Russia, companies and their
managers must not only come to understand the importance of disclosure
and transparency, but incorporate these principles into their standard
business practices, while the government addresses these other
complications.
B. Studying the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
In the United States, it is not a question of whether or not to
implement SOX, but rather a question of whether it is accomplishing the
goal of improving corporate governance. One challenge to overcome is
the amount of money that companies must expend to implement the
provisions. 190 For example, companies and critics question the cost
effectiveness of regulations that attempt to improve internal
monitoring.191 While these regulations may prove to be successful in
reforming internal controls, companies have had to go to tremendous
expense in order to implement the provisions.1 92 Without the immense
costs, the regulations might have been more widely embraced by
companies but, currently, the expense may outweigh any perceived value
of SOX.193
One example of the costs eclipsing the benefits occurs during the
implementation of SOX's monitoring provisions. Managers'
certification of financial statements, the creation of additional internal
monitoring systems, and making managers answerable to independent
directors have all led to higher corporate responsibility and
accountability-some of SOX's major goals. 194 However, implementing
these provisions come at a high cost to most corporations, especially
190. Carol Hymowitz, Corporate Governance (A Special Report)-Experiments in
Corporate Governance: Finding the Right Way to Improve Board Oversight Isn't Easy;
But Plenty of Companies Are Trying, WALL ST. J., June 21, 2004, at R. 1.
191. Id.
192. Bums, supra note 23, at R.8. In response to complaints regarding the expense of
implementing internal monitoring provisions, Representative Oxley, one of the authors of
SOX, quoted a Financial Executives Institutes study that showed costs relating to the first
year of implementation of internal monitoring are likely to be only one percent of a
company's revenue. Id. While this may be true, one percent of revenue for a company
such as General Electric is vastly different from one percent of revenue for a small start
up company in Pittsburgh, which could result in potentially severe financial repercussions





smaller ones.195 Some smaller capitalized companies spent nearly one
million dollars to meet the Section 404 internal monitoring requirements
of SOX. 196 These smaller firms also are concerned that they may see
their external auditing costs more than double as they seek to comply
with the independent auditor provisions of SOX.1
97
While the majority of experts and critics want SOX to be refined,
most agree that its provisions are beneficial, to corporate governance in
the United States, especially those dealing with reporting and internal
monitoring. 198 At the same time, SOX is still a work in progress and
requires further development, primarily through SEC regulations, rather
than by Congressional amendments.' 99
V. Potential Improvements to the Code of Corporate Conduct and the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act
Corporate governance experts cheered the arrival of Russia's Code
and the United States' SOX, but some companies have expressed more
trepidation. Most agree, however, that while both sets of provisions may
be a success in the public's opinion, they still need to be further
developed. °°
The most significant improvement that Russia should implement is
to make the Code mandatory law, instead of a mere list of recommended
practices, in an effort to combat more effectively that country's poor
corporate governance structure. 20 1 Until the Russian legislature passes
significant corporate governance reform legislation, as the United States
Congress did with SOX, Russia can make little progress in the way of
consistent, widespread improvements.20 2 For example, current Russian
law does not define the qualifications necessary for independent director
status.20 3 Consequently, "independent" directors do not have the same
independent attributes as their Western counterparts.20 4  Russian





200. See Bums, supra note 23, at R.8; see also Hymowitz, supra note 190, at R.I. A
Harris poll taken in early 2004 found that fifty-nine percent of investors questioned
believe that the provisions found in SOX will help in protecting their investments.
Hymowitz, supra note 190, at R.1. Additionally, fifty-seven percent said that they would
probably not invest in a company that did not comply with the new standards. Id.
201. Nicholson, supra note 178, at 14.
202. Nicholson, supra note 178, at 14; Igor Belikov, Dir., Russian Inst. of Dirs.,
Breakfast Roundtableat the Ctr. for Int'l Private Enterprise: Corporate Governance in
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independent directors often have significant connections to the
companies on whose board they sit and can sometimes appear to be
outside managers, rather than independent directors.20 5  Their
"independence" comes from the fact that their connections do not rise to
the level of actual employment by the company.
20 6
Russian companies should supplement the legal definition of an
independent director with a contact made between each individual
director and the company.20 7 This contract should clearly outline the
director's role on the board and his duties to the company.20 8 Russian
companies need more than two or three independent directors serving on
their boards, but these directors need to understand their role in
relationship to the company.209 The consequence for breaching this
contractual obligation should be removal from the board.210
Another problem that exists regarding Russian independent
directors is that these directors know which block of shareholders voted
for them.21 ' However, the same shareholders that voted for a director can
call a special meeting of the shareholders and remove that director from
office.2 2 Consequently, in an effort to retain their position of power, the
newly elected directors often are more loyal to their electors than they
213are to the company, negating their independent status. Russia
companies need to adopt measures that ensure the anonymity of
shareholder voting so that directors do not know which shareholders
have backed them in their race for a seat on the board.
As Russian corporate governance codes need to prevent "managers"
from being independent directors, SOX may need some adjustments to
prevent directors, both inside and independent, from becoming
managers. 2 4  SOX requires directors to become more involved in
company oversight in the hope that there will be more supervision of
205. Id. The main criteria used to select members of the board of directors include,
length of service to the company (sixty-three percent of companies use this criteria),
maturity (forty-seven percent), experience in company's business sector (thirty-six
percent), useful connections (twenty-four percent), and loyalty to the company (nine
percent). Belikov, supra note 175, at 9. Independence from company management or
major stockholders is an important criterion that one should find on this list. Id.
206. Nicholson, supra note 178, at 14. One exception to the typical Russian
"independent" director is Mark Mobius, an independent director of LUKoil, and others
like him, whose reputations guarantee their independence. Id.





212. Belikov, supra note 202.
213. Id.
214. Hymowitz, supra note 190, at R. 1.
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managerial decision-making and financial transactions. 215 However, a
director becoming "more involved" means different things to different
boards.216 At one extreme, boards view increased involvement as only
reviewing a checklist to ensure company compliance with the new
regulations.1 7 Other boards carefully have considered their role since
the implementation of SOX and have fundamentally changed the way in
which they oversee their companies.1 8 At the other extreme, some
boards are so concerned about complying with the provisions of SOX
that they micromanage the chief executive officer and other members of
management, creating an imbalance in the corporate governance
219structure. Such a disparity breaks down the monitoring system that the
company has in place and is almost as dangerous as the lack of oversight,
the problem that created the need for SOX in the first place. °
Legislators and agencies, such as the SEC, should review the provisions
of SOX that deal with the role of the board of directors in the supervision
of the company, to better define the role to avoid oversight imbalance.
Another improvement to the Russian Code would be to take a page
from SOX and include penalties for those companies that do not adhere
to the provisions. The Russian government should at least attach such
penalties to those provisions that relate to the disclosure of information,
in order to achieve universal compliance with the Code.22 1 Without the
addition of penalties or sanctions, the Code, even if made into law, will
not have any "teeth" to encourage companies to comply with the
regulations.22 Penalties should include fines imposed by the FCSM, as
well as criminal sanctions for companies that neglect to disclose
information to shareholders.223
Finally, an enhancement to SOX would not be so much a specific
improvement, as it would be a recommended cost analysis of the various
provisions. Overall, SOX implements appropriate reforms to corporate





219. Hymowitz, supra note 190, at R.1.
220. Id.
221. Nicholson, supra note 178, at 14; Belikov, supra note 175, at 29. If penalties
were to be included in the Code of Corporate Conduct, and enforced, Russia would have
to reform its extremely corrupt judicial system, completely and immediately. Nicholson,
supra note 178, at 14. Without such reform, any proposed penalties would be useless as
there is no actual incentive to follow the corporate governance laws; currently, there is
only an incentive to continue to bribe judicial officers. Id.
222. Id.
223. Belikov, supra note 175, at 29.
224. Bums, supra note 23, at R.8.
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more effective if companies did not have to bear the prohibitive cost of
its implementation.225 A thorough cost-benefit analysis might assist
governmental agencies in the promulgation of more cost-effective SOX-
related regulations that still efficiently and effectively address corporate
governance issues in the United States.
226
One method that could make SOX more cost-effective is adapting
the provisions to make their implementation dependent on a company's
level of capitalization.227 This might allow smaller, less capitalized
companies to implement amended provisions that are less expensive and
more suited to their structure.228 This would make SOX more feasible
for smaller companies to implement, while still accomplishing the goal
of overall improved corporate governance in all American companies.
229
VI. Conclusion
Although there are differences in the provisions, Russia's Code and
the United States' SOX are attempting to reform corporate governance in
their respective countries. Both nations have continued to develop their
corporate governance structures in the years since each passed the
original provisions. However, companies in both countries still have a
long way to go before either achieves the ideal level of corporate
governance. To reach this goal, the Russian and American governments
should focus on educating the business world and the public regarding
the virtues and benefits of well-constructed corporate governance.
Without such instruction, businesses in each country remain in jeopardy
of being stagnant and ritualistic in their use of corporate governance
provisions. Sound corporate governance is as much a state of mind as it
is a compilation of regulation-created hoops through which companies
must jump. 230 To truly develop the corporate governance environment in
Russia and the United States, businesses, both small and large, must
change their mindset toward corporate governance, instead of just their
company practices. When this is accomplished, sound corporate
governance will result in substantially increased investor confidence,
regardless of what laws governments introduce or how long corporate
governance has existed. Until then, the Code and SOX need to exist, and
companies must use them to their full potential in order protect against





229. Bums, supra note 23, at R.8.
230. Id.
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